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63-6052

30 JUL 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller

SUBJECT : CIA - DIA Relations

REFERENCE : OCR Memo, Subject as above, Dated 17 April 1963

1. This office is concerned with the status of CIA - DIA relations for two reasons: first, the Comptroller's normal dealings with the DOD on all financial and related matters, whether related to DIA matters or not, will be affected by the general climate of the CIA - DIA relationship; secondly, the task of achieving community-wide program analysis will be tough enough without having it made more difficult by ill-will between the organizations concerned. The following comments are based largely upon the writer's experience as a representative of both the military, CIA and (under Truscott) the DCI.

a. Scientific and technical intelligence: NSCID No. 3 provides for duplication in this field by providing that DOD's production of "military intelligence" shall include scientific and technical intelligence "directly pertinent to the missions of (its) components". The implied suggestion that CIA deal with basic and applied S&T while DOD deals with the development of weapons systems sounds plausible but the dividing line may not be so easy to define and, of course, the decision as to what is "directly pertinent" to an organization's mission is again a matter of judgment and, to the military, a command decision to be made by them. A community wide "inventory" and program analysis would provide a basis for reaching a solution to this problem. With respect to the loss of manpower to DIA, it would be interesting to know whether this was due entirely to offers of higher grades, to a lack of "dedication", or to frustration.

b. Current intelligence: It is questionable whether DIA or any other element in the DOD would agree that because "normally" CIA's current intelligence is produced for the President and the NSC that ipso facto it becomes the "community's prime vehicle for daily intelligence reporting", nor that the needs of the higher levels in the DOD (Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified commands, etc.) were limited to "detailed" current intelligence on military subjects (only?) that were "too specialized" for CIA's publication. Furthermore, the DOD would argue that it has always been a principle with them that intelligence is a function of command and therefore the JCS or any other commanders are privileged to decide for themselves what kind of intelligence they need. Here again, NSCID No. 3 includes in military intelligence, not only S&T but economic intelligence as well - it does not include political or sociological; on the other hand, the DIA Organization and Functions Book includes all kinds of information and intelligence in the "charters" for its various production elements. With respect to DIA's view that it is the "final authority" on military matters, they would probably hold that as they work for the JCS who are, in turn, the military

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advisors to the President, this position is entirely logical. The CIA argument that the DCI needs a capability "for checking the work of other agencies in the intelligence community" is covered by the provision in NSC10 No. 3 that CIA "may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the DCI". The implication in paragraph 15 of the reference, that CIA consistently turns out better military intelligence than the Pentagon may be correct but it would be virtually impossible to get the military to agree. ~~and~~ If the Secretary of Defense should do so, it would more likely result in a further expansion of DIA rather than an acceptance of CIA as the best source of military intelligence.

c. Clandestine operations: If the DIA believes there are "serious problems" between CIA and the military in this field and has presented the DCI with a "bill of particulars" in this regard, it would seem that we do in fact have "current difficulties" with them.

d. Intelligence Collection: The JSG recommended a "National" requirements facility and the DIA "charter" states that its "Registry Division" insures that its requirements registry remains fully compatible with the "National Requirements Registry and Facility". It might be profitable to review the situation and determine why the national facility recommended by the JSG has never been established.

e. Liaison and Reference Services: What CIA prerogatives is DIA going to challenge and where do they feel there has been an overly liberal interpretation of the National Security Act? No one could be more liberal than the military in interpreting its proviso that the "other departments and agencies" shall continue to collect, evaluate, etc., departmental intelligence.

2. Most of the arguments presented here are old ones, DIA has just picked up the ball that used to be carried by the Services, especially the Army. On the other hand, CIA continues, in the eyes of the military, to claim a superiority in all fields that they are not prepared to accept. Through the years the positions appear to have become more solidified rather than more flexible. The only hope for resolution of these problems is an independent study by the DCI, conducted by representatives of his own choosing who have no other duties or interests but who are thoroughly familiar with the problems, and to include a community-wide inventory of activities.


Chief, Program Analysis Staff

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